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Abstract 
This paper studies known indexing structures from a new point of view: minimisation of data exchange between 
an IoT device acting as a blockchain client and the blockchain server running a protocol suite that includes two Guy 
Fawkes protocols, PLS and SLVP. The PLS blockchain is not a cryptocurrency instrument; it is an immutable ledger 
offering guaranteed non-repudiation to low-power clients without use of public key crypto. The novelty of the situ-
ation is in the fact that every PLS client has to obtain a proof of absence in all blocks of the chain to which its coun-
terparty does not contribute, and we show that it is possible without traversing the block’s Merkle tree. We obtain 
weight statistics of a leaf path on a sparse Merkle tree theoretically, as our ground case. Using the theory we quantify 
the communication cost of a client interacting with the blockchain. We show that large savings can be achieved by 
providing a bitmap index of the tree compressed using Tunstall’s method. We further show that even in the case 
of correlated access, as in two IoT devices posting messages for each other in consecutive blocks, it is possible to 
prevent compression degradation by re-randomising the IDs using a pseudorandom bijective function. We propose a 
low-cost function of this kind and evaluate its quality by simulation, using the avalanche criterion.
Keywords: PLS blockchain, Guy Fawkes protocol, Content-addressable storage, Data-structure statistics, Tunstall 
coding, Pseudorandom bijections
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Introduction
This paper gives statistical analysis of some known data 
structures required for the implementation of the PLS 
(permissioned) blockhain (Shafarenko 2021) or PLSB 
for short, whose purpose is to support a swarm of IoT 
devices, or things operating on the premises of a single 
administrative authority, for example a smart hospi-
tal. The use of a blockchain is for the purposes of audit 
trail, authentication and non-repudiation of all actors, 
both human and unmanned, including small, bare-metal 
microcontrollers that supply critical sensor data and 
those which drive actuators.
The utility of permissioned distributed ledger systems 
(permissioned blockchains, or PBCs for short) is based 
on two fundamentals: (i) distributed validity check of 
messages and (ii) an immutable, linearly-ordered ledger. 
In IoT applications, especially in sensor-networks, (ii) 
tends to be more important than (i). Indeed, typically 
messages are not transactions in the financial sense, so 
checks such as double spending are not relevant; value 
checks are domain-specific and are best performed 
by smart contracts, which leaves the authenticity and 
provenance of each message posted on the ledger as 
the only general validity concerns. The PLS blockchain 
(Shafarenko 2021) assures (ii) by employing Guy-Fawkes 
Protocols (GFPs) (Anderson et al. 1998).
A GFP is a post-quantum signature protocol based on 
an unlimited series of interlocking cryptographic hashes. 
GFP computations are fast, messages short and secrets 
neither moved nor kept for a long time; the GFPs are 
resistant to quantum computing as they do not use oper-
ations such as prime-number factorisation or discrete 
logarithm. Finally, by their recursive nature, GFPs define 
a single sequence of signatures that is very hard to split; 
this makes them quite suitable as a basis of a blockchain.
In the next section we will briefly outline the architec-
ture and protocols of the PLS blockchain published in 
an earlier paper (Shafarenko 2021). Operational differ-
ences between the PLS and other blockchains, such as 
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required for its implementation. In Sect. 4 we argue that 
the limited number of users (IoT devices on the prem-
ises and human actors1) and the limit on their commu-
nication duty cycle and disposable energy need efficient 
secure data structures to avoid communicating irrel-
evant data. We propose a Merkle-Tunstall Tree for that 
purpose (Sect.  5) and provide a statistical evaluation of 
its efficiency. The efficiency of the Tunstall compres-
sor depends on the lack of correlations between differ-
ent user’s contributing to the same block. To decorrelate 
block access we propose to use a random permutation 
function to map users’ true IDs onto local IDs for a given 
block, see Sect. 6. To illustrate how proposed technolo-
gies work together we give one illustrated example in 
Sect.  7. Finally, there is a section on related work and 
some conclusions.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
1. Statistical analysis of a sparse Merkle tree with uni-
form, uncorrelated probabilistic leaf occupancy. We 
have obtained the path-weight probability distribu-
tion function (as a recurrence relation in the tree 
height) analytically, without Monte-Carlo simulation. 
It is easy to quantify the function numerically for any 
given height.
2. The proposal and evaluation of a compressed bitmap 
and local enumeration of block users. This makes it 
possible for a user to obtain the proof of absence in 
the block directly from the broadcast root of trust 
without accessing the Merkle tree. We have also 
shown that the local enumeration results in a path 
weight similar to that on the original sparse Merkle 
Tree on average, but the variation is tightly bounded 
from above, which makes it possible to limit the 
packet length when communicating a secure leaf 
path using our structure. By contrast, the path across 
the original tree varies more widely depending on the 
leaf statistics and may result in paths exceeding the 
maximum packet size.
3. The proposal and evaluation of shuffle-shift as a low-
cost pseudorandom permutation technique sufficient 
to break a possible correlation between occurrences 
of different users’ records in block contents. We 
quantified the number of rounds in the permutation 
algorithm to be used taking the avalanche criterion 
as a basis.
PLS blockchain: architecture and protocols
The details of the protocols and their security analysis are 
available from Shafarenko (2021). We present them here 
for completeness. However, for the contributions of the 
present paper we only need to discuss the logistics of the 
PLSB, whose architecture is shown in Fig. 1.
Blocks are formed from transactions communicated 
by things via proxies that make it possible for all things 
to rely on low-power radio communication. To author-
ise a transaction, things run another GFP protocol, called 
SLVP. That protocol’s messages are forwarded by one or 
more proxies to the Fog Server (FS) to be included in the 
next block. The FS forms blocks regularly, on a fixed wall-
clock schedule, by validating incoming SLVP messages 
from things, and adding them to the current block.
Chain. By regular deadlines the current blocks are 
stored in CAS and their hash is signed by producing 
messages of the main protocol, PLS. All PLS messages 
are generated and transmitted by radio via a sealed unit, 
Sequencer, which receives the current block’s hash from 
the FS on a private radio channel. The Sequencer does 
not contain a changeable program and is not connected 
to the Internet, so it is not hackable. The PLS sequence, 
i.e. the sequence of PLS messages, requires a short-term 
secret, which is produced inside the Sequencer using a 
physical source of randomness in one time interval and 
is revealed in the next interval at the same time as select-
ing a new random secret. All things must receive each 
PLS message, validate it, and unlock the corresponding 
block’s hash, which is a file name of the block in CAS, 
see Fig.  2. P- and L- messages cross-validate as shown 
in the figure, and S-messages contain some redundancy, 
which, after deciphering, indicates whether the message 
is valid or not. For example, J can include a run of zeros 
at the end; this would be sufficient to thwart a “random 
Fig. 1 Architecture of a PLSB system
1 In the sequel, when it is not important what kind of actor is meant we will 
call all actors users for short and apply the pronoun ’it’.
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message” attack, which is a possible DoS action of the 
attacker jamming the radio channel.2 Also notice that 
blocks of the blockchain are, as usual, key-value collec-
tions, where the key is the originator’s ID.
Any invalid messages, possibly sent by an attacker will 
fail the validity check with a very high probability. Pro-
gress is assured by limiting the number of invalid mes-
sages using various techniques discussed in Shafarenko 
(2021), but those are exclusively DoS countermeasures 
which do not influence the semantics of the blockchain. 
The initial message P0 is authenticated by all blockchain 
users via external credentials. Users joining the system 
later would require external authentication of the lat-
est P-message instead of P0 . The unlocked hashes of all 
the subsequent blocks are as secure as the weaker of the 
Fig. 2 Structure of the PLS protocol
2 Since the attacker does not know the preimage of P at the time when an 
attack is possible, it can only send an arbitrary message; after unlocking, 
it would produce a near-random bitstring as a would-be block hash. The 
requirement for it to have r trailing zeros will only be satisfied with the prob-
ability 2−r.
Page 4 of 19Shafarenko  Cybersecurity  (2021) 4:36 
credential and the computational hardness of the full 
hash preimage problem (i.e. finding all bit-strings of a 
given length whose hash is a given value). The latter is 
not feasible for an SHA-2 hash even Post Quantum. Also 
notice that the verification and unlocking computations 
are fast (single microseconds) even for a small bare-metal 
microcontroller equipped with a crypto-accelerator, e.g. 
ESP32 (https:// www. espre ssif. com/ sites/ defau lt/ files/ 
docum entat ion/ esp32_ techn ical_ refer ence_ manual_ en. 
pdf ).
Transactions. As mentioned earlier, a thing publishes a 
transaction on the blockchain by running the SLVP pro-
tocol with the FS. A transaction requires one round of 
the SLVP protocol, which takes three blockchain blocks. 
For the security of the protocol it is required that the 
originating thing check that the latest sent SLVP mes-
sage has appeared on a block. As soon as it has, the next 
protocol message can be sent. The first message to send 
is an S-message, which contains the data object to be 
signed. Then an LV-message is posted on the blockchain, 
which provides interlocking hashes and verification 
data (the latter is needed to thwart jam-spoof attacks, 
see Shafarenko 2021). Finally, the thing posts a (proof) 
P-message. The FS validates the P-message using the data 
contained in the previous round’s P-message and the con-
tent of the LV-message sent in between. The FS will only 
include a P-message in a block if the P-message is valid, 
while LV- and S- are posted right away, the reason being 
that invalid LV- or S-messages will be recognised as such 
by the protocol only when the next P-message has been 
posted. In practice the FS and a user may share a secret 
to help the FS to authenticate incoming messages early 
to make it difficult for an attacker to post a large number 
of invalid S- and LV-messages. However, this does not 
help a counterparty that must be mistrustful of the FS. 
So additional authentication, if present, is purely a DoS 
countermeasure; we needn’t focus on it as we concern 
ourselves only with the machinery of the blockchain.
The protocol is summarised in Fig.  3. The diagram 
shows two users, blue and brown, which post their 
SLVP messages on the blockchain using the transmis-
sions shown in the table below. The table is presented on 
behalf of a single blockchain user. Users are independent 
in transmitting protocol messages for themselves and in 
verifying messages sent by others. The verification for-
mulae in the penultimate column enable users (as well as 
the FS that does it first) to prove to themselves that the 
other party has genuinely signed its data object M. If the 
next P-message, Pk+1 checks out, they use its value to 
unlock the data object Mk as defined in the bottom of the 
figure.3 Just like blockchain blocks, the data objects have 
some redundancy, for example, a fixed number of lead-
ing zeroes to adequately defend against random S mes-
sages, sent by an attacker. Notice that the SLVP protocol 
defines variable length encryption for S-messages using a 
block cipher in PCBC mode. Encryption is bijective, i.e. 
information-preserving, and the redundancy required for 
validation in the presence of a random-message attack is 
just a few bytes (e.g. 4 bytes gives the attacker 1 chance in 
a few billion to post valid random data, but even then it 
only subverts a single S-message).
Also note that the FS has authority to introduce a 
new user by posting their very first P-message. The first 
P-message is always marked as such on the blockchain 
for other users to recognise it as the originator’s identity.
Operations. Transactions can be posted by both things 
and human users. Each thing has one or more masters, 
which are typically users (but could be other things). 
Not only does each thing check the posting of each of its 
SLVP messages on the blockchain, it also monitors the 
postings of all its masters and any relevant counterpar-
ties, and validates their data objects by applying the SLVP 
protocol. Alternatively, the thing can participate in a 
smart contract which would only require it to follow and 
validate messages from a single contract engine acting as 
a user. In this paper we limit ourselves to the mechan-
ics of transaction processing, while leaving higher-level 
protocols to further work. We will assume in the sequel 
that each thing is interacting with a very small number 
of other actors and needs to follow a few SLVP threads 
(perhaps 2 or 3). Our focus will be on how to make these 
interactions as computationally and communicationally 
efficient as possible.
Addresses. Each PLS user has an address, which is a 
small number. Since we concern ourselves with a local-
ised enterprise solution (e.g. a smart hospital) covered by 
a direct link radio network (e.g. smart sensors equipped 
with a LoRa, see LoRa and LoRaWAN 2019, transceiver), 
we do not expect the number of things greater than 1000. 
The total number of actors should be a small factor of 
that to account for human users and smart contracts, so 
2–4K addresses is our target. Transactions have an origi-
nating address and a destination.
Frequency. In IoT networks of interest, communica-
tion is limited by the duty cycle to save the limited band-
width that all things have to share. This is in addition to 
the constraints imposed by the energy budget of an indi-
vidual IoT device. Consequently a small fraction (typi-
cally a few percent) of the registered users will be posting 
a transaction in any given block.
3 The original paper (Shafarenko 2021) has a slightly different arrangement for 
S-messages since in the original design CAS was trusted for progress, but in 
the present there is no such requirement.
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Block structure and optimisation challenge
Immutable dictionary. In the previous section block-
chain blocks were shown in the diagrams that consisted 
of records attributed to various users as key-value pairs, 
where the key is the user ID. In a given block only some 
of the registered users would be represented by records. 
Since the frequency of posting on the blockchain in our 
case is severely limited by the things’ communication 
duty cycle (if using LoRa) or energy budget (if using pub-
lic networks or LoRa), the proportion of users posting 
to any given block is expected to be very small. Still, the 
user can only authenticate the block by the S-message 
of the PLS protocol, which, when unlocked, contains 
the block hash. On the other hand, as we mentioned in 
Fig. 3 Structure of the SLVP protocol. Table on behalf of a single user
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the previous section the user is typically interested in 
two or three other users’ contributions, which, given a 
typical enterprise IoT network of a thousand things, is 
still much less than the expected volume of activity in a 
block. Indeed, given a block production rate of 4 blocks 
per hour and a thing data production rate of 2–4 samples 
per day, and bearing in mind that each data post requires 
3 blocks according to the SLVP protocol, we arrive at 6 
to 12 blocks per device per day and circa 100 blocks per 
day in total. This means that in the absence of correlated 
activities we should expect about 5 to 10 percent of the 
swarm to post in every given block. For a 1000-strong 
swarm, the block may contain an estimated 50 to 100 
user records authenticated by a single hash. If a thing 
wishes to access just a few of these, it would have to first 
read the whole block and check the hash to validate it, 
and then dispose of most of these records as irrelevant.
Merkle tree. The standard solution to the above prob-
lem is called the Merkle Tree(MT) (Merkle 1988), see 
Fig. 4. It is a labelled binary4 tree each node ν of which 
has two children, with some labels νL and νR , and its own 
label is ν = H(νL||νR) . A child can either be a leaf or 
a full node in its own right; in both cases it has a label 
but in the latter case it also has two children of its own. 
It is quite clear that a change in any leaf will change the 
root label (also known as the root hash), so the authen-
ticated root makes the whole tree authentic. For each 
node except the root there exists one other node with the 
same parent, which we call adjunct. What makes the MT 
useful is that it can also authenticate a single leaf by pro-
viding a root-path list of adjunct nodes’ labels, or root-
adjunct path for short. For example, to authenticate the 
leaf ν101 shown in red in the figure, given the root label 
r, we only need to know the labels of the blue (adjunct) 
nodes: ν100 , ν11 and ν0 , since





 hashes, which is much less 
than K for the number of leaves in the hundreds that 
we are considering. The tree thus represents an array of 
leaves indexed by the path: a left edge represents 0 and a 
right edge 1; the edges traversed en route to the leaf form 
a bit-string that represents the key. The leaf itself repre-
sents the value of the key-value pair.
Blocks represented as Merkle trees. It is common 
practice in Blockchain construction to represent a block 
as an MT, each leaf of which carries the hash of a user’s 
record included in the block, with the user ID being the 
key gleaned from the leaf ’s root path. A user request-
ing another user’s record (or the one of its own) from an 
intelligent CAS could just receive the root-adjunct path 
corresponding to the requested ID and hash it through 
to match with the root hash value. If the PBC signs the 
root hash of every block it creates, no further security is 
required to authenticate any user records. Our investiga-
tion is of a special case when the maximum number of 
users is small and is known in advance, and where good 
communication efficiency is important. We could use 
an MT with the tree height h close to 10 (to accommo-
date our expected 210 ∼ 1000 users). Since, as we have 
mentioned earlier, we expect only around 50 (maybe up 
r = H(ν0||H(H(ν100||ν101)||ν11)) .
Fig. 4 Merkle tree
4 The tree does not have to be binary, but higher-based trees, and higher-
based MPTs, discussed later, are inefficient for a small number of leaves.
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to 100) users to contribute to any given block, a great 
majority of the leaves will not be used.
Mask-controllable sparse MT. The number of leaves 
in an MT does not have to be a power of 2. Also a leaf 
will provide no value when its root-path names a user 
that did not contribute to the block. We can think of 
such a leaf as unoccupied. An MT with no-value leaves 
is called a sparse MT, or SMT. There are several ways 
of organising an SMT, but proposals usually focus on 
mutable trees that are used for secure updatable key-
value storage. Our interest is in immutable SMTs, 
where efficiency is understood in narrow terms as effi-
ciency of retrieval only. Below we define our own ver-
sion of the SMT, geared towards our objectives.
We can assume that a leaf without value has a special 
label NULL and the parent of two NULL nodes has the 
label NULL as well. This assumption does not diminish 
security due to the fact that a NULL child of any node 
is implicitly associated with the node height. Conse-
quently, the shape of the NULL subtree associated with 
the child is completely defined by its root position. All 
such NULL trees are identical anyway, so a single label 
value fully represents them.
For the verifier to be able to verify a path with NULL 
nodes, it requires a bit mask of length h, where bit-
value 1 indicates that the corresponding adjunct node 
is non-NULL; and the bit-value 0, that it is NULL. The 
NULL labels can then be omitted from the path. Finally 
we extend the domain of H(x) to include NULL-concat-
enated strings by defining that for any bit-string x
where x′ is the bit string obtained from x by flipping all 
bits. Interestingly, a simpler extension
would not be secure, as it allows one to construct a 
second preimage by rotating the subtree or swapping 
nodes along a NULL path. It is easy to see that the hash-
ing process introduced by Eq.  1 is not invariant to any 
such transformation. It is impossible to create a new 
valid SMT with the same root hash and a different leaf 
sequence without solving the second preimage problem.
If the path is mask-controlled, CAS only needs to com-
municate up to h hashes in addition to the bit mask 
for the verifier to successfully compute the root hash. 
Extending the above example, if ν11 were unoccupied, 
CAS could supply the bit mask 101 (the second adjunct 
is missing in path order), and the values of ν0 and ν100 . 
Notice that the bit mask does not need to be secured: if 
it is incorrect, the verifier will compute an incorrect path 
expression and the result will not match the root hash. 
Also notice that the mask is very small compared to the 
hash length: for a tree of 1024 leaves (counting both 
NULL and non-NULL ones) the root-adjunct path con-
tains from 1 to 10 hashes 256 bits each, i.e. 256 to 2560 
bis, but the mask length is only 10 bits regardless.
Merkle-Patricia Trie. The idea of mask-control path is 
similar to that of the so called Merkle-Patricia Trie(MPT) 
(Yue et  al. 2020) where not only the nodes but also the 
(1)
H(x � NULL) =H(x � x′) ,
H(NULL � x) =H(x′ � x) ,
H(x � NULL) = H(NULL � x) = H(x)
Fig. 5 Merkle-Patricia Trie. All unlabelled edges are assumed to have the label ‘0’ if they lean to the left and ‘1’ if they lean to the right
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edges can be labelled. If a node has a single active edge 
(i.e the other edge leads to a NULL subtree), the node is 
eliminated and its parent uses the prefix of the other edge 
as its label, see Fig.  5. The example in the figure is of a 
block where, out of the maximum 8, only users 2, 4, 5, 
and 7 (010, 100, 101, 111 in binary) are present. Notice 
that we still have a binary tree, but the root-adjunct path 
augmented with edge labels requires from one (for leaf 
010) to three (for leaves 100 and 101) adjunct hashes for 
validation, depending on the leaf. The edge labels are 
typically much shorter bit-strings than a single crypto-
graphic hash ( log2 K ≪ 256 ) and so can be neglected in 
determining the communication efficiency of the access 
scheme. The same is true of masks with our version of the 
SMT.
The edge label is secured by hashing it together with 
the corresponding child content in determining the node 
label:
where 0,1 are the edge labels of the left and right child, 
respectively.
It is easy to see that there is a direct correspondence 
between the MPT and the SMT with mask-controlled 
paths. Our construction requires more work when vali-
dating a path: each leaf, irrespective of its path quality 
involves h hash calculations for verification, where h is 
the height of the tree, but in the MPT case the number 
of times a hash is calculated is the same as the number 
of adjunct hashes supplied with the MPT path, although 
each hash calculation also involves edge labels, which 
may increase the cost. The total length of edge labels 
along the root path in the MPT case is equal to the length 
of the mask in the SMT case. However, an MPT path 
requires markers to partition the path string into individ-
ual edge labels. Our construction is slightly more frugal 
in this respect, and it is simpler, which is why we prefer it.
Motivation and optimisation idea
It is obvious from the SLVP protocol that an actor engag-
ing in transactions with another on the PLSB must check 
each block to determine the presence of a transaction 
message from the counterparty. Due to the low duty-
cycle of thing-to-FS communication, the counterparty 
will be absent in a great majority of blocks. However, 
to securely establish the absence, a verifier must trav-
erse the block and verify that the counterparty’s record 
is not there. In the MT case we can use the mask-con-
trolled path to the unoccupied leaf which can contain 
up to h adjunct hashes. In the MPT case CAS will sup-
ply the longest path in the direction of, rather than to, the 
unoccupied leaf. By examining the last node on that path 
ν = H(0||1||ν0||ν1) ,
the user will be able to verify that the necessary edge is 
missing. For example, looking at the MPT in Fig. 5, if a 
user requested the unoccupied leaf 110, the one-step 
path r → ν1 with adjunct material will be sent back for 
validation:
The part of the root path from ν1 to ν110 involves travers-
ing edges 10 (right-left), but the labels specified on the 
second line above are 0 and 11, neither consistent with 
10. The number of hashes to be communicated is the 
same as that for the mask-controlled MT: in the current 
example the latter would require hashes ν111 , ν10 , and 
ν0 . An advantage of the MPT is that it saves the verifier 
extra hash computations by providing segments of the 
path as (hashed-controlled) edge labels. While saving 
some compute time, the effect of it is negligible, since the 
maximum root-adjunct path length is logarithmic in the 
number of leaves (  12 ), and a modern microcontroller 
can compute tens of thousands of hashes per second. A 
disadvantage of the MPT is that it requires communica-
tion of edge labels in addition to the hash for each node 
on the path, but again, compared to the hash length this 
is negligible, too.
What is considerably more important here is that nei-
ther mask-controlled MT, nor MPT reduces the maxi-
mum root-adjunct path length. In our example the 
number of leaves present is 4, but the hight of the MPT as 
a binary tree is 3, not log2 4 = 2 ; it is as if all leaves were 
present. As a result, the system would require to accom-
modate longer communication packets, which may affect 
the guaranteed duty cycle limit of an IoT device.
This brings us to the central idea of the paper: to index 
a block, one might prefer to locally renumber the users to 
achieve a contiguous range of IDs rather than a scattering 
over a regular structure with subsequent remedies such 
as the MPT.
However, before proceeding to our solution, we would 
like to evaluate the base case, the mask-controlled MT. 
We would like to establish some quantitative character-
istics of MT paths under a random distribution of leaf 
occupancy.
Sparse MT statistics
Let us number the levels of the MT from the leaves up, 
starting with 0. We will call the number of adjunct hashes 
associated with a path its weight. Let function PDFk(i) of 
integer i be the probability for a path from a given leaf to 
a hight-k node on the tree to be of weight i. Recall that we 
only count nodes on the path with both children being 
non-NULL as those require an adjunct hash for a Merkle 
010, 1, ν010
0, 11, ν10, ν111
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proof. Let us take a closer look at an example path, see 
Fig. 6. From level 0 we move to level 1 as a left child, then to 
level 2 as the left child, and finally to the level 3 as the right 
child. Clearly different leaves’ paths differ by the choice of 
left- and right- ascension at each level, but the significance 
of the node does not depend on it: the node is only counted 
when both its children are non-NULL. The shaded trian-
gles signify the subtrees that represent the other, non-path 
child of the corresponding path node, which, if non-NULL, 
produces what we termed above the adjunct hash. If the 
non-path node is NULL, this fact is noted in the path bit 
mask, but no adjunct hash is produced.
At level 0, the subtree is of height 0 (it is a leaf ), at level 
1 it is of height 1 (connects two leaves), etc.
Statistical model. We adopt a model relevant to the 
IoT case that the PLS blockchain was developed for. 
A thing submits a message for inclusion in a block very 
infrequently. It does so at random with some small prob-
ability p, whose value depends on the duty cycle restric-
tion, urgency of the sensor data and the available energy 
budget. Without loss of generality let us assume that 
p ∼ 0.1 in our examples, which will give us some intui-
tion of what kind of figures may arise in practical work. 
This level of activity means that a thing participates 
in roughly one block out of 10 or that about 1/10 of all 
blockchain users are active in any given PLS round. We 
also assume that the activities of different things are 
uncorrelated, so any given leaf is either present or absent 
(NULL) for its own reasons, irrespective of the presence/
absence of other leaves.
Path weight. The subtrees in Fig.  6 will consequently 
be NULL-valued with the probability
where k is the level at which the subtree is rooted. Let us 
introduce the Probability Distribution Function PDFk(L) 
as the probability for the weight of a path from level 
k to a leaf to be equal to L. Clearly PDFk(L > k) = 0 , 
(2)αk = (1− p)2
k
,
and we also assume for convenience that for all k, 
PDFk(L < 0) = 0 . It is easy to calculate PDF1 directly:
Indeed, the other child of a given leaf of a height-1 tree is 
NULL with the probability 1− p , producing no adjunct 
hash, so L = 0 with that probability; otherwise (with the 
probability p) the other leaf is non-NULL, supplying a 
single adjunct hash.
For a hight-k path we have a combinatorial problem 
of calculating the probabilities of 2k combinations of 
absence/presence of each adjunct hash (remember that 
these probabilities are completely independent as per 
our chosen statistical model). Instead of doing this, we 
observe the following recurrence relation between the 
paths to neighbouring levels:
Indeed, if the non-path child of the height-(k + 1) path 
node is NULL (this happens with the probability αk ) the 
number of adjunct hashes that the path to height k + 1 
produces is the same as that to height k. Alternatively, 
if the non-path child is non-NULL, it produces one 
adjunct hash, and so the probability to produce L hashes 
for the whole path is the same as the probability to pro-
duce L− 1 for the path to height k. The above equation 
is the weighted sum of those two outcomes, a mixture 
distribution.
The significance of Eqs.  2–4 is in the fact that they 
permit direct calculation of the PDF at any level above 
1 very cheaply given the value of p. The PDF obtained 
can deliver various practical parameters: the average 
path weight:
the standard deviation, the probability that a certain 
limit Lmax is exceeded, etc., which are useful in designing 
bandwidth-limited communication protocols.
Table  1 presents the outcome of a direct calculation 
of Eqs.  2–4 for p = 0.1 and also includes the value of 
¯Lk in the second column (heading “mean”). The table 
shows the value (%) of PDFk(i) , where i runs horizon-
tally. For obvious reasons nontrivial evolution only hap-
pens until αk drops to small values, whereupon Eq.  4 
degenerates to
making the PDF(i) shift to the right by 1 without change 
of shape as k increases. For p = 0.1 sparsity is present 
in the first 7 levels of the tree; from level 8 up the tree 
becomes dense.
(3)PDF1(0) = 1− p, PDF1(1) = p .




i × PDFk(i) ,
PDFk+1(i) ≈ PDFk(i − 1)
Fig. 6 A path across a sparse MT
Page 10 of 19Shafarenko  Cybersecurity  (2021) 4:36 
Another noteworthy feature of the distribution is its 
breadth: 95% of the paths require from 4 to 8 hashes, 
with the mean being around 6, which would necessi-
tate variable length communication, since a factor of 
2 difference cannot be ignored. This variability comes 
despite the compression we have already applied by 
introducing the bitmap-controlled MT.
The sparse MT is indexed by the user ID, and a set of 
active users for an individual block is random as defined 
by our statistical model. To get a feel of how efficient 
the sparse MT is in terms of path weights, we compare 
its mean path weight with that of a truncated dense tree 
carrying the same number of non-NULL leaves. We use 
the least sufficient hight of the dense tree to accommo-
date all non-NULL leaves, and place all NULLs on the 
right hand side of level 0, so that the non-NULL leaves 
may be contiguous, and use Eqs.  1 to deal with NULL 
values (that is what we mean by truncation). Figure  7 
compares the path weights of the two trees. The depend-
ence of the path-weight averaged across the truncated 
tree on the number of non-NULL leaves is not smooth, as 
the tree hight leaps up when the number of non-NULLs 
crosses power-of-two boundaries. Nevertheless, one can 
clearly see that the dense tree has a lighter path weight 
Table 1 Numerical evaluation of Eqs. 2–4. Probability Distribution Function (%) of path weight vs height in a sparse MT ( p = 0.1)
k Mean 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 0.200 81.0 18.0 1.0
3 0.390 65.6 30.0 4.2 0.2
4 0.734 43.0 42.2 13.1 1.6 0.1
5 1.303 18.5 42.7 29.7 8.1 0.9 0.0
6 2.118 3.4 23.0 40.3 25.7 6.8 0.8 0.0
7 3.084 0.1 4.1 23.6 39.8 25.0 6.6 0.7 0.0
8 4.083 0.0 0.1 4.1 23.6 39.8 25.0 6.6 0.7 0.0
9 5.083 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.1 23.6 39.8 25.0 6.6 0.7 0.0
10 6.083 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.1 23.6 39.8 25.0 6.6 0.7 0.0
Fig. 7 Mean path weights. The curve: sparse MT, n = 1024 . Scattered dots: average path weight of a truncated, dense MT with 2⌈log2(np)⌉ leaves
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at the majority of probability values, becoming slightly 
worse just before the probability reaches a value that the 
equivalent dense tree must grow at.
Challenge. Now we are prepared to argue our case. 
A user engaging in the SLVP protocol as verifier must 
examine every consecutive block to see if the prover 
has placed a message in it (i.e. an S-, LV- or P-message). 
According to our statistical model, in a great majority of 
the blocs, in fact, in a factor of 1− p of them, the prover’s 
message is likely to be absent. Nevertheless, the verifier 
needs to satisfy itself that, indeed, no message from the 
prover is present. With the classic MT as well as MPT 
and our own version of sparse MT, the absence of a leaf 
is almost as expensive to prove as its presence with a par-
ticular value. The difference is that for an absent leaf the 
label is NULL and it is not communicated, but that is a 
difference of 1 against, as our calculation shows, circa 
6 adjunct hashes to be communicated when 1024 users 
participate at probability p = 0.1 . This means that on 
average 60 (!) hashes would be required to certify the 
start of an SLVP round. Worse still, each active user, even 
when all it does is wait for a possible signed message 
from a counterparty, will be actively requesting the coun-
terparty’s root-adjunct path from CAS every time a block 
is released, which pretty much destroys the advantages of 
a low-bandwidth Guy Fawkes protocol.
However, a simple remedy exists, which we consider 
next.
Tunstall–Merkel tree
Basic idea. We kill two birds with one stone by provid-
ing a one-time renumbering of users in each block while 
broadcasting the renumbering information together with 
the root of the tree. The purpose of the renumbering is 
to achieve a contiguous range of ID numbers. This way 
absent users will be recognised as such immediately by 
any counterparty involved. As a result the cost of absence 
proof will be zero (plus the cost of the one-for-all broad-
cast message, which need not be requested). The index-
ing structure in terms of new IDs will be the kind of tree 
we have already studied and shown the superior access 
cost of: a dense, truncated one.
We will enumerate users that are present in the fol-
lowing way. Imagine a bitmap sized 2h , where h is the 
height of the original (sparse) MT. In the bitmap 1s mark 
the presence of the corresponding user/leaf and 0s its 
absence. Under our statistical model on average 2kp bits 
(as per binomial distribution) of the bitmap will be 1s. 
Users are renumbered according to the bitmap: the user’s 
new ID is the number of 1s in the bitmap preceding the 
bit that corresponds to the user’s actual ID.
Our statistical model assumes that all users are 
engaged the whole time. A user that decides not to use 
the blockchain for a while will not be able to maintain a 
factor of p messages per block on average until the user 
becomes active again; the user’s bit position in the bit-
map will be 0 during that period. If there are many such 
users, the bitmap may have significantly fewer 1s than the 
aforementioned expectation 2kp . In this sense the expec-
tation is pessimistic.
The maximum number of users is within a near-unity 
factor from the number of things in the swarm, since 
non-IoT users have typically a one-to-many relation with 
things: a human or a server would be in control of several 
IoT devices. The majority of the users tend to be always-
on, active things, which work according to a near-peri-
odic schedule. Another useful circumstance here is that 
the bitmap can be effectively and efficiently compressed 
to a fraction of its length, provided that the distribution 
of 1s is close to random and that the number of 1s is 
known to both the sender and the recipient. The former 
can be made true by pseudorandomisation, and the later 
is easy to achieve by including a small integer (typically 
10-12 bits in length) in the message that broadcasts the 
bitmap. In this section we describe the compression tech-
nique, and in the next one we will propose a simple and 
efficient pseudorandomisation.
Tunstall code. Given a bit string of length n which is 
expected to contain m = pn, p < 1 ones in random posi-
tions (which makes p a true probability), or alternatively 
a bit string which is known to contain m ones, m = pn 
in random positions (which makes p an empirical prob-
ability), with the positions of ones pairwise uncorrelated 
(this is called a zero-order environment), we set ourselves 
the task of finding a bijective function C : Bn → Brw , 
rw < n that maps the string to a sequence of r codewords 
of length w. We wish to minimise rw, or, for a given w, to 
minimise r. The theoretical limit of compression is well 
known from information theory: rw ≥ H0n , where the 
zero-order per-bit entropy H0 is defined thus:
The mapping C is realised by partitioning the source bit 
string into (generally unequal length) chunks and assign-
ing a codeword to each. A chunk b0, b1, . . . , bk is found 
at any given position in our random string with the 
likelihood
The best code with the word length w should assign its 2w 
codewords to the 2w chunks with the highest likelihood. 
It must also make sure that the code is complete, i.e. any 
bit sequence can be represented as a sequence of code-
words. It is intuitive that such a code would be optimal, 
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and it can be proven that it is also asymptotically effec-
tive, i.e. that its compression ratio tends to the entropy 
limit as w tends to infinity.
It is not easy, however, to turn Eq.  5 into a practical 
encoder/decoder. The main reason for it is that the value 
of k is not bounded, and neither is the search for suitable 
chunks to find the top 2w ones in terms of their likeli-
hood. The problem is not so much the amount of work 
required for the search, since we could take the logarithm 
of Eq. 5 and maximise the linear form
where
in the (0 ≤ l ≤ k , k > 0) area of the (l, k)-plane starting at 






 chunks of length k with l 1s in each. 
Their enumeration and mapping at different k would be 
rather awkward.
Tunstall in his PhD thesis (Tunstall 1967) proposed a 
greedy search which at the same time builds a compact 
dictionary structure (the Tunstall tree) that can be used 
for encoding/decoding efficiently, without sharing the 
dictionary (as long as p is known to both the encoder 
and the decoder). The greedy search turns out to be of 
excellent quality, too, delivering the entropy limit asymp-
totically (Tunstall 1967), and, as a recent study shows (Jo 
et  al. 2017), with a rapidly decreasing redundancy as w 
increases. The redundancy formula from Jo et al. (2017) 






being useful for our analysis, we present it below (with-
out derivation and rewritten in our notation):
We will return to Eq. 7 later and present our own calcula-
tion of the relevant range of parameters, but let us first 
introduce the dictionary idea, see Fig.  8. The dictionary 
is a (generally imbalanced) labelled binary tree. Both the 
nodes and the edges are labelled. The edge labels are 0 
and 1 as usual, and a node’s label is the likelihood value of 
the chunk composed by reading the edge labels along the 
path from the root to the node. The algorithm builds the 
tree node-by-node, as follows: 
1. Create a root node with two edges labelled 1 and 0 
to two child nodes labelled with the value of p and 
1− p , respectively.
2. Find and mark the maximum likelihood leaf node. 
Denote its label as R.
3. Create two leaf children of the marked node and con-
nect them with edges labelled 1 and 0. Make the node 
labels the value of Rp and R(1− p) , respectively.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the tree has 2w nodes 
besides the root.
5. Now relabel each leaf by its consecutive leaf num-
ber while visiting the leaves in some order agreed 
between the encoder and decoder.5




Fig. 8 Tunstall Tree for p = 0.4 . First two steps of the algorithm
5 For example, left to right, or in prefix order. The properties of the code 
remain the same under any permutation of the codeword assignments but the 
practicalities of encoding/decoding require a shared order.
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Tunstall encoding is achieved by running the source 
bit-string down the Tunstall tree bit by bit until a leaf is 
reached, at which point the codeword is read off from 
the leaf label and the process returns to the root. Tunstall 
decoding requires a 2w-entry table where variable-length 
path sequences are set against codewords, with the for-
mer read off from the path to the leaf labelled by the lat-
ter. We note with satisfaction that Tunstall decoding has 
the cost O(1).
Implementation. Tunstall encoding (and especially 
decoding) is very undemanding, well within reach of 
a small, system-on-chip smart sensor. To avoid accu-
racy/underflow problems with repeated multiplica-
tion in generating the dictionary at the receiver (Step 3 
of the algorithm above), one could use log-likelihoods 
as node labels. Then instead of multiplication, log p 
and log(1− p) are added to the parent label to produce 
labels for the 1- and 0-child, respectively.6 This way for 
any reasonable table size, computational accuracy will 
not be a problem. We implemented the algorithm to see 
what kind of residual redundancy we could be getting 
from a specific Tunstall code. The results of our running 
a Tunstall compressor through 1 million random bits are 
presented in Table 2. Comparing this with Eq. 7, we con-
clude that at w = 4 the compressor is already within 10% 
of the asymptotic mode, when doubling the codeword 
length roughly halves the redundancy ρ.
From the practical point of view, if we target a block-
chain with ∼ 1K  users, with 10% of them posting mes-
sages in any given block, p = 0.1 suggests a compressed 
bitmap of at least 1024 × 0.47 = 482 bits or 61 bytes. 
An 8% residual redundancy would increase this by only 
5 bytes. However, the bitmap is broadcast together with 
the root hash, 32 bytes long, and a few extra bytes of 
forced redundancy for the purposes of S-message veri-
fication (as per PLS protocol). This increases the length 
of the S-message up to nearly 100 bytes, and at this level 
a redundancy of the compressor to the tune of 5 to 10 
bytes makes little difference.
If the number of users drops to 0.05 of the total, even 
the poor compression quality for w = 4 results in only 
379 bits (though 82 bits, or 11 bytes, more than the 
entropy limit), which is still less than the already accept-
able  482 bits we observed for p = 0.1 . An alternative is 
to use a list of raw ID numbers, circa 52 in total, each 
requiring 10 bits. This is 520 bits, far worse than the com-
pressor’s output, but not significantly worse than 482, 
and the list length would decrease in proportion to p. 
If p were to drop further below 0.05, and if the Tunstall 
compressor further deteriorated, the uncompressed ‘list’ 
option could at some point be preferred, with the switch 
controlled by a single additional bit in the message.
We conclude that a four-bit Tunstall code is all that is 
required to implement the PLS S-message within half of 
the maximum LoRa message length (250 bytes). To aid 
the reader’s intuition, we present an example of a 4-bit 
Tunstall code for p = 0.15 in table  3. For each code-
word we additionally show its log-likelihood. Notice that 
unless the log-likelihoods are exactly identical, as is the 
case for codewords 1011 and 1100 which correspond to 
chunks with the same counts of 1s and 0s, the differences 
between log-likelihoods manifest themselves in the first 
(decimal) fractional digit already, so computational accu-
racy should not be a concern.7
Table 2 Observed redundancy ρ of Tunstall code
Sample length before compression: 106 . Column headers: w codeword length; 
p probability of 1; κ compression ratio; H0 per-bit entropy; ρ = (κ − H)/H 
residual redundancy(%)
w p κ H0 ρ(%)
4 0.05 0.37 0.29 30.4
4 0.10 0.50 0.47 7.5
4 0.15 0.65 0.61 6.9
8 0.05 0.32 0.29 13.4
8 0.10 0.49 0.47 4.6
8 0.15 0.63 0.61 3.8
Table 3 4-bit Tunstall code for p = 0.15

















6 We use the fact that the greatest number has the greatest logarithm.
7 The sender and the receiver could use different floating-point arithmetic, 
incur different rounding errors and end up using different dictionaries. This 
example shows that for a small dictionary this is not a concern.
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New structure of the root of trust. In the original 
PLS protocol (Shafarenko 2021) the S-record was a 
message that contains the block’s root of trust Ji , which 
was the root hash of the Merkle tree representing the 
new block Bi . In the light of our analysis of indexing 
costs presented in Sect. 4.1 and the properties of Tun-
stall encoding described in the current section, we pro-
pose to modify the root of trust Ji as shown in Table 4.
The total message length is L+ 320 bits or L+ 40 
bytes. We expect L to be close to 60 bytes in most 
cases (which is the entropy limit for 1024 users at 10% 
occupancy per block on average), which makes the 
S-message circa 100 bytes long, but if necessary L can 
be increased to 128 bytes resulting in the packet length 
168 bytes, still well within the length limit (255 bytes) 
for LoRa communications. A 128-byte bitmap would 
support the number of users up to 1024 without Tun-
stall compression, or about twice as many if Tunstall 
compression is used at 10% occupancy.
The hash T requires the server to renumber the users, 
building a new Merkle tree and computing its root 
hash. The user will recompute T to validate any leaf 
hash and its adjunct hashes sent to it by CAS, unau-
thenticated and unsigned, at request.
Notice that the redundancy field is only 32 bits, 
since it is impossible to crack the S-message directly: 
both the plaintext and the key are unknown, the for-
mer due to the XORing of the next P-message, yet to 
be received, to the plain text, see Fig. 2. As mentioned 
earlier, the purpose of the redundancy field is to thwart 
a random message attack for the DoS purposes, and so 
a 32-bit redundancy translates into a less than 1-in-a-
billion chance to cause the recipient to accept a false 
message, which is more than sufficient in the IoT world.
Finally, let us dwell a little on the block’s MT whose 
root Ti is included in the block’s root-of-trust Ji . The 
leaves of that tree are hashes of the user records with 
the user ID corresponding to the path label sequence 
as usual, except the IDs are now new IDs calculated 
from the block bitmap and occupying a range from 0 to 
m− 1 without gaps. Since m is not necessarily a power 
of 2, the MT generally consists of a complete half with 
leaf labels in the interval [0, 2⌊log2 m⌋) without gaps and 
a truncated half with labels in the interval [2⌊log2 m⌋,m) , 
also without gaps, with the rest of the leaves labelled 
with NULL. The shape of the MT depends solely on one 
parameter, m, which is a part of the root-of-trust. Con-
sequently, no further information, such as path masks, 
etc, is required for access and validation of the root 
hash, Ti . For a truncated tree Eqs. 1 can be replaced by 
a simpler pair
without loss of security. The reason why the above is as 
secure as Eqs. 1 is that subtrees cannot be rotated in the 
truncated half as this renders the tree sparse; it is impos-
sible to create a second pre-image truncated tree this 
way. As a result the hash calculations here are no more 
expensive than their cost for the equivalent MPT.
For our running example of 10% occupancy and the 
total number of users 1024, the value of m will have an 
expectancy of around 102, which means this path will 
be between 1 and 7, and never longer. Table 1 indicates 
that the standard (MPT or mask-controlled MP) would 
require from 3 to 9 adjunct hashes. The difference 
between 7 and 9 is not big, but notice that 8 hashes would 
already require more than one LoRa packet to transmit.
We would like to emphasise here that the main effect 
of using the Tunstall-Merkle Tree (TMT, which is how 
we wish to call our construction) rather than, say, MPT is 
not that fewer hashes have to be communicated with the 
former than the latter, but the fact that the latter requires 
a full path irrespective of the presence or absence of the 
leaf for secure retrieval. By contrast, a TMT provides an 
absence proof directly from the root-of-trust bypass-
ing the Merkle Tree entirely. Since the SLVP protocol 
requires every thing to check the presence of its own 
S- and LV- messages before advancing the protocol, 
(8)H(x||NULL) = H(x); H(NULL) = NULL
Table 4 Structure of the proposed block root-of-trust Ji
Offset (bits) Field Size (bits) Description
0 Ti 256 Root hash of the Merkle Tree for the new block Bi
Built using new user-IDs
256 n,m 24 n: total number of users, m: how many present
280 Flags φ 8 Bits 0,1: bitmap type (plain, compressed, list, empty)
Bit 2: (0: w = 4 , 1: w = 8)
Bits 3–7: pre-randomisation parameter (see next section)
288 Bitmap M L ≤ 1024 Processed bitmap content
L+ 288 Redundancy 32 All zeros, for PLS validation
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and since a thing would typically monitor another user’s 
infrequent activity, the cost of absence proof dominates 
over the cost of secure retrieval. Nevertheless, it is reas-
suring to see that the latter is also improved, in terms of 
limits if not necessarily average, by our approach. The 
price we are paying is some additional calculations well 
within the capabilities of resource-limited systems such 
as most things tend to be.
Returning to the compression issue, there is one factor 
yet to be accounted for. We remarked earlier that our sta-
tistical calculations are based on the zero-order assump-
tion, i.e. that different users’ behaviours are uncorrelated. 
Obviously it is not the case when users engage in a 
higher-level protocol with one another, e.g. producer/
consumer. This may skew the chunk statistics resulting in 
a longer codeword sequence for the block bitmap. In the 
next section we will propose a simple remedy.
Pre‑randomisation
The idea is to apply a bijective function to the source 
user ID which depends on a parameter, block number i. 
A different block number should result in a very differ-
ent permutation. This way a position in the block bit-
map will have the value 1 in a proportion of bitmaps that 
does not depend on the value of other positions. A user 
ID will be associated with a pseudorandom sequence of 
positions as new blocks are produced. Invertibility (bijec-
tion) is very important, as it prevents different users 
from being mapped on the same bit-position in the bit-
map, thus ensuring that the mapping is a pseudorandom 
permutation.
A simple and effective pseudorandom permutation 
based solely on the block number i can be achieved by 
analogy with randomising the order in a deck of playing 
cards. One player performs the deck shuffle: for the card 
in position i in the deck i ∈ [0, n = 2d) represented in 
binary as i = idid−1 . . . i0 , the new position of the card i′ , 
represented in binary as i′di
′
d−1 . . . i
′
0 is obtained from the 
current position by applying the following operator
which is a cyclic shift left. This corresponds to dividing 
the deck into two halves and interleaving them, exactly as 
an experienced dealer would.
When the shuffle is finished, the other player shifts the 
deck, i.e. divides it into two unequal parts and transposes 
them. In terms of card numbers, this corresponds to add-
ing a pseudorandom value v modulo 2d:
i′di
′
d−1 . . . i
′
0 = id−1id−2 . . . i0id = σ(i) ,
i′ = i + v mod n = τv(i)
Applying the shuffle-shift operator Qv = σ ◦ τv to a range 
ρ = [0, n) t times with a pseudorandom choice of v:
has the same effect as repeatedly shuffling/shifting a deck 
of cards, which, the intuition suggests, delivers a rather 
arbitrary permutation. We call t the number of rounds.
Note that the operators σ and τv have a negligible cost 
even when executed by the least powerful platform, as 
they take literally a few machine instructions. The cost of 
pseudorandom generator that produces a series of v-val-
ues is similarly small if we use a standard Linear Congru-
ential Generator (LCG):
where n is a power of 2, v0 is set to the block number, and 
the factor F is any positive integer that satisfies the well-
known Hull-Dobell constraint: F = 5 mod 8 . We chose 
for F the hex value 5EED which satisfies the constraint 
and which has more than enough significant digits for 
any reasonable n.
Our solution appears quite attractive from the point of 
view of its cost; however, while bijectiveness is guaran-
teed by construction, we need to be reassured that the 
solution can deliver sufficient randomness of mapping at 
a reasonably small number of rounds t.
Avalanche test. The quality of a pseudorandom map-
ping can be assessed with the help of the so-called ava-
lanche criterion (Webster and Tavares 1986), used in 
evaluation of symmetric ciphers and hash functions. We 
consider it next in relation to our mapping Q.
Select the block-number v0 for the test. Next, 
select a number x from the range ρ and some inte-
ger 0 ≤ k < d and prepare two numbers x1 = x and x2 
same as x1 , except bit k of it is flipped. Apply the map-
ping Q to both and take the bitwise XOR of the results: 
Ai(x, k) = Q(x1)⊕ Q(x1) . Let Ai(x, k , l) be the lth bit of 
Ai(x, k) . Define the correlation matrix Kkl thus:
Here the averaging is done over values of x ∈ ρ and block 
numbers v0 . Good randomness of the mapping manifests 
itself in the closeness of all matrix elements of Kkl to 1/2:
This means that if we flip a random bit in a random value 
x the probability that any bit in the image of x under Q 
flips in response is close to 1/2. In other words, if we flip 
one bit in x, on average close to one half of the bits in the 
result will flip. The name “avalanche effect” is to do with 
the fact that small changes cascade through the rounds 
Qvt . . .Qv1Qv0 ρ
vk+1 = F × vk + 1 mod n, 0 ≤ k < t ,
(9)Kkl = �Ai(x, k , l)�x,i ,
(10)maxkl
|Kkl − 1/2| ≪ 1/2 .
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of the computation causing further changes until all bits 
of the result are affected in a complex and unpredictable, 
though of course deterministic, way.
We have applied the avalanche criterion to our pro-
posed randomiser to estimate the acceptable minimum 
value of t, the number of rounds. As it is impossible to 
average over all potential values of the block number v0 , 
we limited ourselves to 50 random samples taken from 
the interval [0,  10000] The results have proven quite 
insensitive to the averaging over v0 , which in not surpris-
ing given that we established that the required t-numbers 
are in the hundreds. The averaging over x was done by 
sweeping the whole range ρ.
The results of the avalanche test are presented in 
Table  5. For practical purposes we limited ourselves to 
n = 1024 , 2048 and 4096, since more users are unlikely 
to be supported by the communication infrastructure of 
a single site. The results show that a surprisingly large 
number, around 200, of rounds is required to achieve 
good randomisation. It is large compared to the number 
of rounds one expects to be necessary to randomise a 
deck of cards (of the order of 10), but it is not large tech-
nically: a microprocessor would have to execute only a 
few thousand instructions to compute the image i′ given 
i. This has to be done as many times per block as the 
number of counterparties that the user has to monitor on 
the blockchain. For a thing this would be a number of the 
order unity, hence the cost would be negligible even on a 
tight energy budget. On the other hand, setting t to 200 
would ensure that possible correlations between bits in 
the image do not exceed 3% (0.013 normalised by 1/2), 
which should be good enough for practical purposes.
Finally, let us recall that the IoT platform is low-
power, but the server running the PLS protocol via the 
Sequencer is not. It has ample capacity to analyse the 
Table 5 Avalanche test of the pre-randomiser
Headers: d input length (bits); t number of rounds; δ mapping quality, δ = maxkl(Kkl − 1/2) , see Eq. 10
d t δ d t δ d t δ
10 100 0.061 11 100 0.113 12 100 0.164
10 150 0.014 11 150 0.026 12 150 0.042
10 200 0.008 11 200 0.009 12 200 0.013
Fig. 9 Retrieving a user record from block 269 for ID= 45 ; for this block m = 5 . Solid arrows show the flow of data, dotted arrows indicate a possible 
bypass controlled by φ
Page 17 of 19Shafarenko  Cybersecurity  (2021) 4:36  
quality of the permutation in terms of its influence on 
Tunstall compression. We have reserved 5 bits in φ to 
pass to the shuffle-shifter an integer value in the inter-
val [0, 32). It is convenient to use the value 0 to indicate 
that a random permutation is not required,8 whereas a 
nonzero value is added to the round counter t. The server 
can try up to 31 additional rounds and choose the one 
that gives the best compression. The users receiving the 
root of trust will be aware of how many additional rounds 
should be performed and will maintain consistency.
Putting it all together
Next we consider a complete example of a user attempt-
ing to retrieve a contribution to a block that has been 
made either by itself or a counterparty.
Figure  9 presents the flow of data when a block-269 
S-message is received and successfully unlocked by 
a user. The user is about to request the contribution to 
block 269 from user ID 45. To accomplish this, it needs 
to decode the received block bitmap by feeding it to the 
Tunstall decoder together with the parameters n and m 
(total number of users and the number of users contrib-
uting to block 269, respectively). The decoder produces 
the uncompressed bitmap. At the same time the user 
ID (45) and the block number (269) along with the total 
number of users and configuration parameters are fed to 
the shuffle-shifter, which will perform the assumed and 
the additional number of rounds extracted from φ and 
will produce its output value, 20. The bit in position 20 of 
the uncompressed bitmap happens to be 1, which means 
that the contribution from ID 45 is present in block 269. 
The number of 1s in the bitmap to the left of position 
20 is 4, so the index in the truncated Merkle tree for the 
contribution in question will be 4. The path to leaf 4 is 
highlighted in red in the figure.
The user’s CAS request will include the block number, 
269, and the ID index, 4. CAS will respond with the leaf 
hash h4 and the adjunct sequence
which consists of the labels of the two nodes of the 
tree marked in blue. Because the user acquired m from 
the unlocked S-message, i.e. the root of trust, it knows 
the shape of the tree. Consequently, no mask is com-
municated, but the user is able to reconstruct the mask 
anyway.
To validate the requested h4 , the user checks that the 
following equation holds:
where T is the root hash received with the unlocked 
S-message. Notice that we used Eqs.  8 to account for 
NULL nodes.
An alternative scenario is shown in Fig.  10. When 
attempting to retrieve the contribution of user ID=17 
to block 305, it turns out that the output of the shuffle-
shifter points to a 0 in the uncompressed block bitmap. 
Since the unlocked S-message is the root of trust, this 
V0 = h5, V2 = H(H(h0 � h1) � H(h2 � h3)) ,
H(V2 � H(h4 � V0)) = T .
Fig. 10 Obtaining proof of absence. Solid arrows show the flow of data, dotted arrows indicate a possible bypass controlled by φ
8 This could be advantageous when, for example, no compression is used.
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constitutes a proof that block 305 has no contribution 
from user 17. Notice that CAS is not involved in the pro-
cess at all.
Related work
The PLS blockchain and the protocols in basic form were 
proposed in Shafarenko (2021). The idea of sparse Merkle 
Tree has an unclear origin. To the best of our knowledge 
it was first put forward by Bauer (2004) and was recently 
improved on in Dahlberg et  al. (2016). Both studies are 
concerned with mutable trees, with objectives very dif-
ferent from ours, although, like ourselves, the authors 
remark on the importance of proofs of absence (non-
membership). Tree statistics is tackled theoretically in 
Bailey and Sankagiri (2021) in an attempt to optimise 
mutable MTs for the Bitcoin blockchain in the context 
of Bitcoin transactions. The objectives of this study are 
similar to ours as the authors attempt to group the leaves 
together to minimise the proof length, but they do it 
using tree transformations (taking the data structure red-
black tree as a starting point), while we achieve a similar 
objective by renumbering the keys (user IDs in our case).
The compression technique we use is due to Tunstall 
(1967) and this seems to be uniquely suitable for our case 
since it is based on empyrical probability of leaf occu-
pancy, which is available to the Fog Server running PLS 
and which takes next to no resources to communicate 
to the client. The efficiency of our technique depends on 
this method.
We used our own pseudorandom permutation as a 
combination of a perfect shuffle and a random shift, 
using a classical LCG source (Lehmer 1951). There exist 
various methods of pseudorandom permutation, an oft-
cited one being the Fisher-Yates shuffle (Fisher and Yates 
1963), first published in the 1930s (citation unavailable). 
The idea there is to choose a (pseudo)random element 
of a sequence of source items and exchange it with the 
first element on the sequence. Clearly, if this is repeated 
enough times then any possible permutation could be 
achieved. A recent paper (Bacher et  al. 2018) presents 
a fast, parallel algorithm that mimics the technique of 
merge-sort except the merge makes a pseudorandom 
choice when ordering two elements for the output.
However, our situation is quite different. Not because 
we are dealing with a contiguous range of numbers rather 
than an abstract sequence of objects: one could enumer-
ate the objects and the problem would boil down to the 
one we are faced with. Our situation is different because 
the sender and the recipient must choose the same per-
mutation. To encode an arbitrary permutation of n num-
bers would take close to (m− 1) log2m bits, which is 
the same order of magnitude as the block bitmap we are 
trying to make more compact. Of course the ability to 
perform an arbitrary permutation is not required: all we 
want is break correlations between user IDs in a series of 
block bitmaps, and for this any sufficiently rich subgroup 
would do.
Conclusions
Statistical analysis of a sparse Merkel Tree under the 
assumption of uniform, uncorrelated leaf occupancy 
has been presented. The model obtained allows direct 
computation of the Probability Distribution Function 
for path weights given the leaf-value probabilities. The 
path weight was quantified in terms of the number of 
adjunct hashes required for its leaf proof. We deter-
mined that the mean path weight of a sparse MT tree 
is close to that of a dense, truncated MT tree, with the 
latter being slightly better at most leaf-probability val-
ues p in the practically interesting interval. We pro-
posed an alternative structure, a Tunstall-Merkle tree, 
which combines a dense, truncated MT and a Tunstall-
compressed bitmap indicating leaf ocupancy. We tested 
the compressor at several practical values of code size 
and quantified its residual redundancy. We found that 
a very small code table (16 or 256 codewords) proves 
sufficient for achieving near-limit compression, which 
means that Tunstall decoding presents no storage prob-
lem whatsoever to an IoT platform. To improve the 
effect of compression we further proposed a decorella-
tion facility in the form of a shuffle-shifting algorithm 
and tested its properties using the standard avalanche 
criterion to determine the number of rounds. Both the 
Tunstall decoder and the shuffle-shifter with the code-
word size and the number of rounds, respectively, suf-
ficient for our purposes are quite processor-efficient as 
well, since they involve inexpensive operations (table 
indexing, cyclic shift and binary addition) and short 
instruction sequences in implementation.
The main effect of the proposed technology is a drastic 
improvement in the cost of the SLVP protocol. Indeed an 
SLVP verifier has to check every block for the presence 
of counterparty (prover) contributions, and no such con-
tribution would be present in a great majority of blocks. 
Our proposed Tunstall-Merkle tree has zero proof-of-
absence cost, and when a leaf is present the communi-
cation cost of retrieval is in most cases better than that 
for the standard MT and MPT. Obviously our technique 
offers no advantage to a system with an unlimited and 
dynamic number of users, but it is beneficial for at least 
the PLS blockchain situation. The statistical analysis of a 
sparse MT/MPT has significance beyond the area of our 
study; it could be useful for planning and designing any 
secure storage structure that involves Merkle trees.
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Future work will concentrate on higher-level proto-
cols which control the interaction of resource-limited 
things with a smart contract.
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